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Love and social justice in learning for sustainability 
Morwenna Griffiths and Rosa Murray 
Moray House School of Education, Edinburgh University 
 
Abstract: 
The planet seems to be heading into an ecological catastrophe, in which the earth 
will become uninhabitable for many species, including human beings. At the same 
time we humans are beset by appalling injustices. The Rio Declaration which 
addressed both these sets of problems contains conceptual contradictions about 
‘development and ‘nature’ . This paper addresses the issue of whether it is logically 
possible to work for both global justice and ecological sustainability. The article (1) 
proposes a way of responding to the spirit of the Rio Declaration without reinstating 
its contradictions; (2) considers a posthuman perspective on the issue; and (3) 
proposes a phenomenological approach to ethics and justice which would include 
both the human and more-than-human parts of the world. In section (4) the 
implications for education are drawn out, in terms of ‘learning to mind’. Finally, links 
are drawn to the Journal theme of translation.   
 
Introduction 
We are living in a geological era which has been called ‘the anthropocene’. The 
planet seems to be heading into an ecological catastrophe, as a result of which the 
earth will become uninhabitable for many species, including human beings. At the 
same time, we humans are beset by appalling injustices, both locally and globally. 
The Rio Declaration (United Nations 1992) addressed both these sets of problems. It 
proposed:  
(Principle 1) Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.  
(Principle 3) The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.1 
 
The Rio Declaration was followed by the United Nations (UN) Decade of Education for 
Sustainable Development 2005-2014, which adopted the Rio view that it was possible 
to “protect the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system”. 
 
Doubts have been raised about whether this is a coherent proposal (e.g. Bonnett 
2002, 2007; Kahn 2008; Kopnina 2013; Brennan and Lo 2015). Two doubts are 
particularly relevant for this Special Issue and in this article.  First, the Rio Declaration 
did not spell out what kind of environmental and developmental system might be 
entailed by Principle 1. Clearly, the life styles of the wealthy nations are not 
sustainable: to maintain them would require the resources of several planets. 
However, the term ‘development’ is widely understood as leading to more people 
enjoying such life styles. Second, there is an implicit assumption that human beings 
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are separate from ‘nature’. It is precisely this assumption which is questioned by 
those working to avoid ecological catastrophe. They argue that one root of the 
problem lies in the sharp distinctions drawn between human beings and the rest of 
the planet.  
 
In this article we discuss the issue of whether or not the Rio declaration is coherent; 
similarly for the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development. These questions 
go to the core of the theme of this Special Issue – philosophy as translation and the 
understanding of other cultures. Global injustice and global citizenship are intricately 
related to issues such as global warming, availability of water, clean air and the oil 
economy, all of which affect everyone but which are disproportionately caused by the 
rich and suffered by the poor. They also affect the young more than the old. This 
paper addresses the issue of whether it is possible to work for global justice and also 
to avoid ecological collapse. If it is possible, it will be necessary to communicate 
across languages and cultures, including perhaps, being able to understand what the 
more-than-human world is letting us know about global well-being. How can we make 
sense of respecting those whose language we can’t (yet?) understand – and which 
may be only semi-translatable or even untranslatable? What connections can we 
make across differences: differences of language, culture, world views, and even 
more radically, differences of species?  
 
Since the issues raised by the Rio declaration will increasingly affect coming 
generations, they are particularly relevant in educational practice and policy. 
However, deciding what to do about them is far from straightforward. The authors of 
this article take the view that policy makers, educational theorists and teachers need 
to come together to work out possibilities. The article is a beginning.2  
 
We begin by (1) proposing a way of responding to the Rio Declaration without 
reinstating its contradictions. We go on to flesh that out by (2) considering a 
posthuman perspective on the issue, and (3) proposing a phenomenological approach 
to ethics and justice which would include both the human and more-than-human 
parts of the world. In the following section (4) the implications for education are 
drawn out, in terms of ‘learning to mind’. We conclude by relating the arguments and 
proposals in this article to the themes raised in this Special Issue.  
 
1. Living well: sustainable development, sustainability and social justice 
In Scotland the preferred term is ‘Learning for Sustainability’ (LfS) rather than 
‘Education for Sustainable Development’. This avoids – rather than resolves – some 
of the tensions inherent in the Rio Declaration. The government agency, Education 
Scotland, states that underpinning the use of the term ‘learning for sustainability’ is 
the aim that teachers:  
See how their global citizenship, outdoor learning, and sustainable 
development education activities overlapped and could be joined up. In 
3 
 
introducing this term, the group wanted to help schools weave all of these 
themes together so that the collective impact would be greater than the sum 
of the parts. A whole school and community approach can only be achieved 
when the themes contained within LfS are fully connected and aligned. 
(Education Scotland n.d.) 
The themes are further detailed in a ‘word cloud’ made up of 50 phrases, including 
‘outdoor learning’, ‘health and well-being’, ‘global citizenship’, ‘social justice’, 
‘sustainable building and grounds’ and ‘protecting biodiversity’, but it is left unclear 
how they all cohere, if they do, within the single issue of ‘Learning for sustainability’.  
 
We suggest that an alternative approach would be to recognise that all these themes 
are an attempt to answer an overarching question: ‘How should we humans live well 
in our world?’, where the term ‘world’ is understood ecologically, as inclusive of both 
human and more-than-human elements, in relationship. This is an extension of a 
basic question for ethics and social justice, which has been addressed in many ways 
over the centuries. The question is a fruitful and significant one precisely because 
there are no simple or straightforward answers. Education is needed to help students 
develop the judgement and wisdom to deal with the complexities and contingencies 
of living well in the world.  
 
2. A posthuman perspective on ethics and social justice 
In considering both the human and the more-than-human elements as relevant to 
social justice, we turn to posthumanism. ‘Posthumanism’ is a name given to a fairly 
new set of approaches which have arisen from a range of theoretical backgrounds. It 
would be impossible to give an adequate overview in this short article; there are 
significant differences as well as similarities in the approaches , as can be seen in 
existing overviews of the topic (Badmington 2000; Coole and Frost 2010; Soper 2012; 
Herbrechter 2013). Here we draw attention to some of the strands that have been 
significant in our discussions. We have been influenced by new materialist theories 
which blur the boundaries between humans and technologies and also the 
boundaries between humans and other living beings (Bennett, 2010; Coole & Frost, 
2010; Haraway 1991, 2008). We have also been influenced by Latour (2004, 2010, 
2014) who argues for the agency of non-human participants or ’actants’, emphasizing 
that events occur in ‘assemblages’. His earlier work developed ‘actor network theory’, 
though he has now moved beyond it. Another set of approaches are drawn from deep 
ecology which is a set of ideas developing its original formulation by Naess (1973). 
These approaches emphasize inter-relatedness, from a perspective of ecocentricism. 
 
Two themes from posthumanist discussions have been particularly helpful as we try 
to address issues of social justice in a way which include both human beings and the 
more-than-human. The first is the critique of anthropocentricism. This critique 
informs the second theme, ‘social materiality’.  We begin the discussion of 





The notion that human beings are qualitatively different from the rest of the entities 
on the planet, including living ones has pervaded Western thought for centuries. 
Aristotle based the difference in rationality: man, he famously said, is the rational 
animal. Religions in the West have long placed human beings between the animal 
and spiritual, superior to, and stewards of, the merely animal. Biologists and 
ethologists, like philosophers, have hypothesised many possible sharp divisions 
between the human and the more-than-human. They include intelligence, language, 
consciousness and personality. These hypotheses have become untenable as biology 
and ethology continue to provide evidence which breaches these boundaries.  
 
Some examples which challenged our own anthropocentricism may help show the 
range of ways in which these boundaries are being breached. Intelligence and 
reasoning, it has been discovered, is not the preserve of human beings, or even of 
mammals. Birds too, especially members of the Corvus and parrot families can count, 
design and make tools, use mirrors, and recognise shapes, including faces (Woolfson 
2010; Davis n.d.). The relatively new field of plant neurobiology demonstrates that 
plants exhibit behaviours that cannot be accounted for in terms of automatic 
reactions to chemicals, water, gravity or light. These behaviours can be described 
straightforwardly as intelligence and learning – but the use of these terms is 
controversial. Similarly, the ability to communicate is not, we now realise, purely 
human. There is evidence that this, too, is something that plants do. Again, it is not 
agreed whether, or how far, this is to count as ‘language’.   Part of the problem is the 
lack of a brain in plants. However, it appears that brains are only needed for 
movement, something that animals do but plants do not (Pollan 2013; Mancuso and 
Viola 2015). Consciousness and personality seem to be much more widespread than 
previously assumed. Experiments by Barron and Klein (2016) show that the mid-brain 
of insects indicate that there is ‘something it is like’ to be an ant or a ladybird, for 
example. Experiments on bees, cockroaches and aphids indicate that insects have 
personalities (Planas-Sitja`, Deneubourg, Gibon and Sempo 2015; Barron and Klein 
2016; Dow, 2016). 
 
We also want to draw attention to ‘social materiality’. A key concept is assemblage 
because it indicates relationality between material objects, including human beings. 
The term ‘material objects’ includes not only living creatures and geophysical objects, 
but also structures which do not have extension in space, such as theories, systems 
and religious entities (Latour 2010). This conceptualisation contrasts with a 
traditional understanding of agency in which sharp distinctions are drawn both 
between intentions and behaviour and also between animate, agentic beings and 
inanimate, inert ones.  
 
Social materialism and the lessening of anthropocentricism challenge some of the 
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anthropocentricism of traditional approaches to ontology, epistemology and ethics.  
Anthropocentricism is the view that human beings are distinct from the rest of the 
world of plants, animals, geological formations, and the technologies that human 
beings have created. From a more-than-human perspective we humans are all part of 
the biosphere within the geophysical system which is the planet. At the same time 
social materialist approaches take the view that we are always already positioned as 
part of the technical more-than-human world we have created, and part of the 
theories, religions and systems we use to understand it. For example, who and what 
we humans have become is dependent on technologies of literacy, on financial 
systems and on the internet – all of which were invented by human beings. We 
humans are geophysical, animal, cyborg and encultured beings sharing 
characteristics and agencies with other physical, animal, cyborg and encultured 
beings. 
 
The loss of sharp anthropocentric boundaries between human and more-than-human 
challenges traditional anthropocentric approaches to ethics. Moreover, ethical 
responsibility is re-conceptualised within a relational view of how the world changes 
and is changed. No longer is it possible to hold that humans are the only, or primary, 
holders of moral standing. For example, deontological, utilitarian and Levinasian 
approaches to ethics commonly assume that only humans can be described as 
rational, happy or have the kind of otherness which has a face.  
 
3. Living well: ethics and justice 
We now return to our overarching question of ethics and social justice: ‘How should 
we humans live well in our world?’ The answer depends on metaethical assumptions 
about the nature of that ‘we’ and ‘our’. That is, an understanding of ethics and justice 
depends on assumptions about the nature of self and community and also on 
assumptions about how far our conduct is  our own doing (individually or in 
community), and how far it is determined by other factors (including chemistry, 
physics, language/discourse and social systems). I refer back to a book I wrote many 
years ago on self and community in which I argued for a relational theory of the self – 
understood as part of a web or patchwork of connection with others  (Griffiths 1995). 
Drawing on relational, phenomenological and feminist approaches, I argued that the 
self is knitted together, partially unpicked and then rewoven over and over again 
during a lifetime. I further argued that,  
“I” is a fragment rather than an atom. I am always part of a “we”. I cannot 
assume I know who “we” is. (Griffiths 1995: 16).  
I now realise that from a posthuman perspective, the ‘we’ – and so too the ‘I’ – needs 
to be understood in terms not only of other human beings but also of more-than-
human relationships. We construct and are constructed by the social materialities we 
inhabit and recognise. Our sense of self, depends on our relations with a range of 
other beings and contexts, from the bacteria in our guts, to the technology we use, to 
the places we inhabit.  As Donna Haraway has said, we are creatures ‘of the mud, not 
6 
 
the sky’ (2008: 3). At the same time, we Westerners who live in the midst of modern 
technology are all cyborgs3.  
 
In developing a posthuman, ethical framework we have been influenced by Hume 
(1998) and Merleau-Ponty (1968, 2002) and also by a range of relational, 
phenomenological, feminist theories (e.g. Young 1990; Whitford 1991; Benhabib 
1992; Battersby 1998; Cavarero 2000). We follow Hume in his argument that both 
ethics and social justice begin with responses which need to be developed through 
education. Hume says that the response is an:  
Internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole 
species. …But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a  proper 
discernment of its object it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning 
should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, 
distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general 
facts fixed and ascertained (Hume [1751] 1998: 75-6)  
Following Merleau-Ponty (and coherent with Hume’s arguments), we want to 
emphasise that our human responses are not confined to our relations with other 
human beings. As Merleau-Ponty (2002) argues, we human beings are both of the 
world and intertwined with it. We respond to it: to animals, plants, places, things 
around us in our homes, and the buildings in our locality. We respond to rocks and 
mountains, trees and forests. We sometimes do this directly, sometimes through our 
cyborg selves using binoculars, television and social media. We respond to other 
humans: to their faces or their voices. We respond to the sounds of insects and birds. 
In all of these, our response may be one of love or hatred, but possible responses 
also encompass a wide range: amusement, disgust, horror, delight, contempt, fury, 
admiration and so on. Alternatively, we may refuse to acknowledge the range of our 
responses, and seek to exploit the other – human and more-than-human – solely for 
our own instrumental ends.  
 
Some examples will demonstrate the complexity of these responses. Consider the 
variety of ways that people react to demagoguery, to the plight of refugees, and to 
family members who might be in trouble. None of these reactions are simple and all 
require moral judgement. Equally, our reactions to oncomice, and to other animals 
bred for medical research, are complex matters of response and understanding. It is 
not just mammals or even animals that generate ethical dilemmas. Trees provide 
livelihood but that is not the whole reason that people hug them. Indeed, it is not just 
living things that are significant for us. Moral outrage is generated when ancient 
artefacts are destroyed. Consider the widespread concern about the ruins of Palmyra 
in Syria, the library of Timbuctoo, and the Buddhas in Afghanistan, a concern that 
went far beyond any national or religious affiliation. On the West Coast of Scotland 
Gruinard Island was evacuated in the 1940s so that it could be used as a testing 
ground for anthrax. Again, discomfort is widely expressed about such an experiment 




Moral responses and judgements may result in decisions to act (or not to act). Social 
materialism means that our decisions, moral or otherwise, are to be understood in 
terms of the assemblages they concern, our ecologies.  Even small children act as if 
happiness, love, and fairness (i.e. justice) are all dependent on each other. The cry 
made by young children, ‘It’s not fair!’, is a familiar one. It depends on the 
expectation that the people listening want the child’s happiness, and wants it 
because they love him/her: because they mind. Children then need to learn how to 
mind about the good of others, which, as Hume argues, is the start of social justice4. 
Early on they find that these others include animals and plants, such as family pets 
and garden plants (at least in British urban homes). In sum, the point of justice is joy 
and it springs from love.  
 
As children mature into adulthood, their responses to the world continue to contribute 
to their apprehension of what social justice is  and how to contribute to social justice 
in their own contexts. This process of coming to understand ethics and social justice 
requires education, as the quotation from Hume explains. Social justice, like ethics, is 
a complex – and contested – notion and needs to be taught.  In relation to human 
beings it is multi-dimensional. Issues of fair distribution, mutual recognition, and 
open association, are all significant, difficult to apprehend, and sometimes lead to 
conflicting imperatives (Fraser, 1995; Young 2000; Griffiths 2003, 2009, 2012). So 
judgements have to be formulated using knowledge, wisdom and understanding. 
They will be contested, as different people make different judgements. Moreover, 
they can never be final. Indeed, social justice could never be an achieved static state, 
given a world which is always in a process of becoming something else. A useful way 
of understanding this is to realise that the noun form, ‘social justice’, is misleading. It 
is more active than that: more of a verb. Thus there will no utopia, but happily, 
neither will there be a dystopia.  
 
Just as we learn to make our responses to human beings ones of love and justice, so 
we can learn to do the same to the rest of the world. The rapacity and cruelty that is 
found in human relations is like the rapacity and cruelty that is found in relations with 
the rest of the world. Refusal to acknowledge our common humanity is a source of 
unjust human relations. Equally, unjust relations stem from a refusal to acknowledge 
our interconnections and commonalities with the more-than-human. In terms of social 
justice, and learning for sustainability, teachers and students need to consider what 
they need to know and understand about our human impact on the things they value 
as individuals, intellectually, emotionally, spiritually, and aes thetically, as well as on 
the long term maintenance of an ecosystem that includes the existence of human 
beings.5 In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, human beings need to understand the ‘chiasm’ or 
‘intertwining’: that we are both entirely of, but also able to reflect on, the world 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968: Chapter 4). So what we do to others, be they human or more-
than-human, we do to ourselves. Again, as with the merely human world, judgements 
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are needed, and will be contested. There are no ultimate answers in ethics. Learning 
how to act with love and justice is difficult and uncertain. 
 
4. The role of education in learning to live well in the world  
We have been emphasising the essential role of education in learning to live well in 
our world, human and more-than-human. Of course we acknowledge that education 
has multiple and sometimes conflicting purposes and effects in relation to the state, 
the economy, and the intrinsic worth of learning (Griffiths 2012). However, all these 
purposes are subsidiary to the heart of the matter for education: living good, just 
lives. This is a matter of education, not just of enculturation, disciplining or providing 
role models, because, as we have argued, there is no final certainty about the good. 
There is no utopia to be offered. Instead teaching should be open enough - and 
rigorous enough – to enable students to form their own, well-founded views about 
how to live. They need to work out how to contribute to remaking the world in order 
to lead worthwhile lives now and in the future. To do this they need to understand the 
world and their place in it. Or to put it another way, the task of teachers is to 
engender in their students the joy in learning, the joy from learning, and the wisdom 
to contribute to the collaborative task of creating a just world (Griffiths 2012). In this 
view of education, we follow Arendt (1968) – and Wollstonecraft before her – in their 
arguments that the young should not be told what to think or how to behave (Griffiths 
2014).  As Wollstonecraft said:  
“It is difficult for us purblind mortals to say to what height human discoveries 
and improvements may yet arrive when the gloom of despotism subsides 
which makes us stumble at every step.” ([1792] 1994: 102) 
Therefore, as Arendt said:  
“The function of the school is to teach the children what the world is like and 
not to instruct them in the art of living…nor to strike from their hands the 
chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us.” (1968: 
196) 
 
If students are to learn to engage enough with the world to develop informed, critical, 
heartfelt judgements, a pedagogy is required which inspires, persuades and 
encourages them to pay attention and to re-think their outlook on the world. Such an 
open-ended pedagogy is well described by Hogan (2009): 
“What is at issue here is the thoughtful creation of new imaginative 
neighbourhoods on a daily basis, or on successive occasions through a normal 
day.” (80) 
Spivak prefers to talk of desire rather than of imagination, and also points out that 
this pedagogy requires students to move well beyond their accustomed areas of 
comfort.  
“[Education as] the uncoercive rearrangements of desire: [even though]… 




In terms of teaching ethics and social justice, such openness means that teachers are 
less concerned with specific actions that the teachers think right, than to make sure 
that the students have sufficient information and understanding of the world as it is. 
Indeed, the conclusions that students reach may not concur with those of their 
teachers. So teaching students to live well is not so much about their using some 
politically correct vocabulary, for instance, or considering air miles when they buy 
food, as enabling them to be informed and responsible in working out what living a 
good life might be, individually and collectively.  
 
Open-ended pedagogies are difficult and demanding for both teachers and students, 
and pedagogical relationships are key to their success. Teachers enable students to 
become who they are not yet, as they develop relationships not only with each other, 
but with school subjects and with what matters in the world (Griffiths, Hoveid, Todd 
and Winter, 2014). All pedagogical relationships are ones of response. Everyone and 
everything is changed through these relationships. All of them involve minding about 
something or someone. An open-ended pedagogy (unlike one primarily concerned 
with imparting a pre-determined curriculum of information or skills) has to take this 
into account as part of the point of the pedagogy.    
 
Mind (like matter) is an interesting English word. The verb and gerund forms, ‘to 
mind’ and ‘minding’, include both affective and cognitive associations. These forms, 
unlike the noun form, ‘mind’, imply the inseparability of reason, emotion, feeling and 
logic. Minding is characteristic of human relationships. It always includes both 
understanding and feelings: admiration, awe, cold, curiosity, competition, ease, 
horror, imagination, love, memory, warmth, etc. As we have argued in the previous 
section, these are relationships of love and justice – or their opposite. For human 
beings, minding is always an ethical matter in relation to other human beings and 
also, often, to the rest of the world. Thus a desire for justice is rooted in minding6. 
 
Since minding depends on learning, education can be characterised as learning to 
mind. Thus a pedagogy for ethics and justice depends on teachers introducing the 
world to students while allowing them time and space to respond whole-heartedly, 
without any pressure to respond in specific ways. In other words, pedagogical 
strategies have to make space for response to what matters, and openness to 
minding about it.  Moreover, this is not just a matter of allowing spaces within the 
school day. Undirected experience and play have their place, but are not enough. It is 
not enough to provide children with opportunities to be in nature7, as in the ‘children 
in nature’ movement (Malone 2016). Neither is it enough  
“to see child’s play in nature…[as a] seedbed for a lasting responsiveness to 
calls of natural care and future considerations…[which] can be loosely 
touched upon in the formation of personal judgement and discourse 
competence.” (Postma and Smeyers 2012: 409) 
10 
 
Instead there have to be specific pedagogical strategies and practices which require 
students to pay whole-hearted (or loving) attention to the world and to make engaged 
connections with it. These connections are the subject to change as the teacher 
ensures that the students are questioned using information and critical discussion 
(Nicol 2014). Thus, as with any area of the curriculum, both responsive and proactive 
pedagogical strategies are needed. To return to the quotations earlier in this section, 
this is an uncoercive rearrangement of desire (which takes some pushing and 
shoving). This is an introduction to new imaginative neighbourhoods (using both 
persuasion and guile). This is a source of delight and joy in a worthwhile life. And it is 
giving students the chance to participate in re-making the world with wholehearted 
understanding – and in being re-made 
 
Educational philosophy risks being irrelevant unless its conclusions are grounded in 
example. Therefore we have presented three examples from pedagogical practice. 
We have been careful to ensure that they represent different approaches within our 
overall framework. We have also drawn from different age phases:  early years, 
secondary schooling, and Higher Education. Finally, since we do not have enough 
space to give many details, we have been careful to choose examples which have 
already been published. 
 
Our first example is from Early Years. Murris’s proposals for a posthumanist approach 
to early years literature begin not with play in the outdoors, or even indoors with 
objects (as in Rautio and Winston 2015) but with story books. She emphasises the 
significance of the art work and of the quality of writing because they engage the 
children who respond with attention. She goes on to explain how the books can be 
then used as a basis for asking “open-ended and thought-provoking conceptual 
questions” (2015: 64) in which they question – and learn to mind about – conceptual 
distinctions such as human/animal, machine/life and nature/culture.  
 
In our second example Winter draws on her own experience as a schoolgirl on a 
geography field trip. She explains the significance of her response to the place they 
visited: 
“I had copied countless diagrams of U-shaped glaciated valleys…but never 
seen one for real…The picture remains inscribed in my mind 40 years later…I 
was shocked, disturbed and disoriented by the emptiness and eeriness as I 
confronted this mysterious feature.” (Winter, 2012: 281) 
She goes on to describe methods she uses as a geography educator which make a 
space for secondary pupils to attend to a place and also to be challenged by different 
ways of representing it, through maps, aerial photographs, technical diagrams and 
sculpture. She creates an opportunity for her students to mind about a place rather 
than reducing it to a simple example of a currently dominant, instrumental, technical 




Our final example comes from a postgraduate outdoor education course. Higgins and 
Wattchow discuss the kinds of educational encounters that may occur when the 
group and their teachers undertake a canoe journey down the River Spey in Scotland.  
The teachers are explicit that the “merits of an outdoor journey relate directly to the 
quality of the subjectively lived-experience of the participants” (2013: 19).  
Now I find time to dwell on this river, a thoroughfare for millennia, and its 
banks that reveal a history of human use – deforestation, farming and 
settlement, warfare and peace, privilege and poverty, railways, 
industrialisation, and the distilleries with the emblematic Spey malt whiskies 
– Macallan, Aberlour … (28) 
At the same time, they ensure that students’ understanding of the river is challenged 
and extended by introducing multiple perspectives:  
“The perspectives of the geologist, hydrologist, ecologist, the landscape 
historian, the economist, the fisher, the artist and the canoeist are just some 
of the possibilities that might all be brought to the students’ attention and 
into the realm of their experience.” (20)  
Meanwhile the teachers are themselves attentive to questions such as: 
“How will complex, ambiguous and contradictory meanings be dealt with? 
How is this whole learning experienced cognitively as well as ‘in’ the 
students’ sensing bodies?” (20) 
 
These examples give some indication of open-ended pedagogical strategies for 
learning to mind. Significantly, all of them are recognisable as ‘just good teaching’. 
Learning to mind need not entail extraordinary practice; it does entail a reflective, 
indeed minding, approach to pedagogy. In each case students were introduced to 
new imaginative neighbourhoods in ways which can be described as uncoercive 
rearrangements of desire. All of them make space for students to pay attention to the 
matter at hand, while also challenging them to be rigorous in their use of facts, 
critical of their previous responses and assumptions while able to deal with 
ambiguous and multiple meanings. All of them deal in their different ways with 
issues that are relevant to the central question of ‘How we should live well in the 
world’. None of them give easy answers but may provoke the students into deeper 
thoughts and actions about social justice, love and sustainable living.  
 
Concluding thoughts 
We began this article by referring to the UN Rio declaration and the UN Decade of 
Education for Sustainable Development 2005-2014 These initiatives indicate that 
there is now a growing international awareness that global well-being depends on an 
acknowledgement of the interdependence of the human and the more than human. At 
the same time, as we pointed out, both documents contain serious tensions. So far 
they remain unresolved. The peoples of the world have still found no strategy which 
will achieve the central Principles of the Rio Declaration. Nor is there a consensus on 




Keen to find some resolution, we have suggested an approach which brings together 
both human flourishing and ecological concerns as two aspects of a single concern 
for social justice, which we understand as endeavouring to live well in our world. This 
is a matter for education: for we human beings, learning to understand our place in 
the world requires us to take a critical approach to our own individual and cultural 
responses to the human and the more-than-human. It also requires us to attend to 
the responses of others: both human and more-than-human. The last of our examples 
in the previous section explains how students are required to attend not only to their 
own individual and collective responses, and not only to a range of human 
perspectives, but also to how the river itself responds to its changing contexts.  
 
Attending to the responses of others entails communication not only across 
languages and cultures but also across different kinds of being on the planet.  
Translation is key to such a process. This proposal highlights some aspects of both 
communication and translation. In particular, only some communications are in verbal 
language or even in gesture.  And only some are intentional. Translation transcends 
different modes of existence. Further highlighted is that while communication and 
translation may be only partial, they are essential to the future well-being of the 
world: the ecosystem and the future existence of human beings on the planet. The 
difficult effort needed to understand, if only partially, what the rest of the world has 
to tell us is entirely worthwhile. 
 
Education has an essential role to play in enabling human beings to develop a full, 
heartfelt apprehension of the world they live in. We have expressed this in terms of 
‘learning to mind’. Education will not may not be sufficient but it is necessary. In 
general, if enough young people mind about living well in the world, that is, mind 
with full, whole-hearted understanding, the hope remains that there will be a 
worthwhile future life for them and their children. It is the task of educators to make 
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Endnotes  
1 Principle 2 is less relevant to the theme of this article: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
2 Both authors were school teachers and now teach in Higher Education. Morwenna 
Griffiths has been in teacher education for many years, while Rosa Murray was, until 
recently, an educational policy maker and is the person who was most closely 
responsible for introducing Learning for Sustainability into the Teaching Standards in 
Scotland in 2013. They met regularly during the 2015-16 academic year to discuss the 
relation between ecological sustainability and social justice. This paper is one result 
of the collaboration. It was written by Morwenna who uses ‘I’ (Morwenna) as well as 
‘we’ (Morwenna and Rosa). But all the arguments have been developed and are 
owned by both of us. 
3 Of course, many non-Westerners also live in the midst of modern technology. On 
the other hand, much of the world’s population has little access to it. For instance, 
according to World Bank data, in 2016 only 40% of the world’s people had access to 
the internet (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2).  
4 Learning that each of us is part of a human community means losing self-
centredness. However, it does not mean losing the self. This is analogous to losing 
anthropocentricism. Abandoning the view that humans are the only holders of moral 
standing does not mean we abandon the moral standing that we have. Further, while 
acknowledging that the human perspective is only partial, it is the only perspective 
available to us.   
5 We are indebted to our colleagues at the University of Edinburgh, Peter Higgins and 
Robbie Nicol, for this way of articulating the educational task. 





the inseparability of reason, emotion feeling and logic will apply to other entities in 
the world, but the investigation of that is beyond the scope of this article.   
7 We have avoided using the term ‘nature’, which is notoriously ambiguous, and also 
liable to invoke a Romantic vision of wilderness and beauty.  
